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THE LIMITS OF PERMISSIBLE
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH
IN NEW YORK
HON. VITO M. DESTEFANO†
INTRODUCTION
In December 2018, New York’s Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics (“ACJE”), which I proudly served on for ten years,
issued Opinion 17-28, concerning an inquiry by a judicial candidate as to whether he or she could respond to a candidate
questionnaire prepared by the New York State Right to Life
Committee (“RTL questionnaire”).1 In the RTL questionnaire,
the candidate is asked a series of questions concerning the
candidate’s personal beliefs on abortion, the beginning of life, Roe
v. Wade,2 the definition of personhood, the New York and United
States Constitutions, and so on. Each question asking for the
candidate’s personal beliefs is preceded by a prefatory acknowledgment of “the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case
based on the law and facts of that case.”3
Concluding that the RTL questionnaire, “when viewed as a
whole, is clearly designed to elicit a series of implied pledges,
promises, and commitments, touching on a wide variety of closely
interrelated issues that may come before judges at every level of
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N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-28 (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-28.htm [https://perma.cc/56ACUMLY].
2
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3
Id. (quoting State Right to Life Comm. Jud. Candidate Questionnaire from
N.Y. State Right to Life Comm., Inc., to N.Y. Judicial Candidates at *1–4 [hereinafter Questionnaire] (on file with author)).
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the judiciary” and that “a candidate’s impartiality” could “ ‘reasonably be questioned’ in a wide variety of cases . . . if he/she agreed
to the bold-faced statements on the questionnaire,”4 the candidate was advised to decline responding to it. As I strongly
disagree with the ACJE’s opinion, I write this Article to express
my personal views on the subject. Let me emphasize that this
Article reflects my attempt to engage in a reasoned analysis of an
admittedly difficult topic which, in my opinion, has not been
sufficiently explored or discussed by academics, ethics committees, or judges since the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (occasionally
abbreviated herein as “White”).5
State ethics advisory panels and disciplinary bodies in New
York and elsewhere have struggled with the contours of permissible judicial campaign speech following White, which invalidated
Minnesota’s “announce clause” that prohibited judicial candidates from “announcing their views on ‘disputed legal or political
issues.’ ”6 However, a review of the opinions of advisory committees in states such as Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee,
Pennsylvania, and Georgia7 concerning candidate questionnaires
that seek to elicit candidates’ personal opinions on controversial
or disputed legal or political issues reveals no general prohibition
against providing responses. There are, instead, restrictions
against furnishing answers that appear to bind the candidates
upon assuming judicial office or requiring candidates to give
assurances about “keep[ing] an open mind” and carrying out
judicial duties “faithfully and impartially.”8

4

Id. (quoting 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.3(E)(1) (2020)).
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
6
Id. at 768, 788 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000)).
7
The judicial ethics canons in Pennsylvania and Georgia were amended to
permit responses to questionnaires. See PA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 11
(2014); GA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2016). In 2006, the Kansas Judicial
Ethics Advisory Panel advised that a candidate could not answer a questionnaire
which sought the judge’s personal opinions on a variety of controversial topics,
including the rights of an unborn child, the death penalty, pornography, the right to
define marriage, etc. Kan. Jud. Ethics Advisory Panel, Jud. Ethics Op. JE 139 (Apr.
17, 2006). However, the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications rejected the
Panel’s conclusion inasmuch as “judges and judicial candidates are allowed to
publicly announce their views on legal, political, or other issues.” Kan. Jud. Rev. v.
Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1173–74 (Kan. 2008).
8
PA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 11 (2014); GA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.2
cmt. 3 (2016); see also Stout, 196 P.3d at 1176.
5
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Interestingly, in 1996, several years prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in White, New York eliminated its announce
clause over concerns that it was unconstitutional.9
In light of the White decision, and considering the relevant
rules, court decisions, and Judicial Conduct determinations and
opinions, it is my opinion that a candidate can ethically answer
the RTL questionnaire.
I. SUMMARY OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
In 1996, Gregory Wersal sought election as associate justice
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.10 While campaigning, he distributed materials that criticized Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions on controversial issues like “crime, welfare, and
abortion.”11 A complaint was filed against Wersal by the Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, an office under the direction
of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board,
which “investigates and prosecutes ethical violations of lawyer
candidates for judicial office.”12 The Lawyers Board eventually
dismissed the complaint.13 In regard to whether Wersal’s campaign materials violated the announce clause, the Board expressed
that it had doubts as to the clause’s constitutionality.14
Nevertheless, Wersal withdrew from the election, fearing that his
legal career would be in jeopardy if he received any additional
ethical complaints.15
In 1998, Wersal, again a candidate for election to judicial
office, “sought an advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board” as to
“whether it planned to enforce the announce clause.”16 In response, the Lawyers Board stated that although it had
9

N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N GOV’T ETHICS COMM., FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: THE IMPACT OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V.
WHITE ON THE NEW YORK STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 5 (2004),
https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/WHITEREPORTDRAFT12304.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5X3R-GQ4Y]. Prior to the elimination of the announce clause in New York, Canon
7(b)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct read as follows: a judicial candidate “should
not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office [or] announce his views on disputed
legal or political issues . . . .” New Code of Judicial Conduct is Adopted by the
American Bar Association, 58 A.B.A. J. 1207, 1212 (1972).
10
White, 536 U.S. at 768.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 768–69.
13
Id. at 769.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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“significant doubts” about the clause’s constitutionality, it could
not answer his question absent a list of the specific announcements he intended to make.17
Wersal and other plaintiffs, including the Republican Party
of Minnesota, brought suit in federal district court, seeking an
injunction against the enforcement of the announce clause, as
well as a declaration that the clause violated the First Amendment on its face.18 To advance this claim, Wersal argued that “he
was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed
issues” while campaigning, even in response to questioning, “out
of concern” that he might violate the announce clause.19 The
district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
concluding:
the State had compelling interests in maintaining the actual
and apparent integrity and independence of the judiciary
and . . . the restrictions on candidates’ political activity and fund
solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve those interests. It also
upheld the provisions against vagueness and equal protection
challenges. In its analysis of the announce clause, the court
determined that the critical issue was whether the provision
was narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in maintaining the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The
district court construed the clause to reach only the discussion of
issues likely to come before the court, having considered that the
Judicial Board had argued for a narrow interpretation of the
clause and that the Minnesota Supreme Court, when possible,
construes laws to prohibit their application to constitutionally
protected expression. The court then concluded that the provision [with the limited construction] did not offend the First
Amendment.20

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting,
agreeing with the clause’s limited construction and holding that
the clause also permitted “general discussions of case law” and
“judicial philosophy.”21
The United States Supreme Court reversed, initially noting
and rejecting the “limitations . . . placed upon the scope of the

17

Id.
Id. at 769–70.
19
Id. at 770.
20
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 860–61 (8th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), rev’d sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
21
Id. at 882, 885.
18
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announce clause” inasmuch as they prohibited “a judicial candidate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal
question within the province of the court for which he is running,
except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in [that]
context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound by
stare decisis.”22
The Court then examined the concept of impartiality—
identified by the State as a compelling state interest served by
the announce clause—and determined that the announce clause
did not survive a strict scrutiny analysis, even assuming that
impartiality, howsoever it was defined, was a compelling state
interest:
One meaning of “impartiality” in the judicial context—and
of course its root meaning—is the lack of bias for or against
either party to the proceeding. Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law. That is, it guarantees a party
that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him in
the same way he applies it to any other party. This is the traditional sense in which the term is used. . . .
We think it plain that the announce clause is not narrowly
tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality)
in this sense. Indeed, the clause is barely tailored to serve that
interest at all, inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or
against particular parties, but rather speech for or against
particular issues. To be sure, when a case arises that turns on a
legal issue on which the judge (as a candidate) had taken a
particular stand, the party taking the opposite stand is likely to
lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking that position is
just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees
it) evenhandedly.
***
It is perhaps possible to use the term “impartiality” in the
judicial context . . . to mean lack of preconception in favor of or
against a particular legal view. This sort of impartiality would
be concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal application
of the law, but rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance
to persuade the court on the legal points in their case. Impartiality in this sense may well be an interest served by the
announce clause, but it is not a compelling state interest, as
strict scrutiny requires. A judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a
22

White, 536 U.S. at 771, 773 (italics omitted).
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necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason.
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does
not have preconceptions about the law. . . . Indeed, even if it
were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived
views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so.
“Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was
a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” The
Minnesota Constitution positively forbids the selection to courts
of general jurisdiction of judges who are impartial in the sense
of having no views on the law. And since avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable, pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the “appearance” of
that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling state
interest either.
***
A third possible meaning of “impartiality” (again not a
common one) might be described as open-mindedness. This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose
his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the
issues arise in a pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to
guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal
points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so. It may
well be that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it,
are desirable in the judiciary, but we need not pursue that
inquiry, since we do not believe the Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted the announce clause for that purpose.
Respondents argue that the announce clause serves the
interest in openmindedness, or at least in the appearance of
openmindedness, because it relieves a judge from pressure to
rule a certain way in order to maintain consistency with statements the judge has previously made. The problem is, however,
that statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal
portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges
(or judges-to-be) undertake, that this object of the prohibition is
implausible. Before they arrive on the bench (whether by election or otherwise) judges have often committed themselves on
legal issues that they must later rule upon. More common still
is a judge’s confronting a legal issue on which he has expressed
an opinion while on the bench. Most frequently, of course, that
prior expression will have occurred in ruling on an earlier case.
But judges often state their views on disputed legal issues
outside the context of adjudication—in classes that they
conduct, and in books and speeches. Like the ABA Codes of
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Judicial Conduct, the Minnesota Code not only permits but encourages this. That is quite incompatible with the notion that
the need for open-mindedness (or for the appearance of openmindedness) lies behind the prohibition at issue here.
The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate
for judicial office may not say “I think it is constitutional for the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.” He may say the
very same thing, however, up until the very day before he
declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until
litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to
render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.
Justice Stevens asserts that statements made in an
election campaign pose a special threat to open-mindedness
because the candidate, when elected judge, will have a
particular reluctance to contradict them. That might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises. A candidate
who says “If elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power
to prohibit same-sex marriages” will positively be breaking his
word if he does not do so (although one would be naive not to
recognize that campaign promises are—by long democratic
tradition—the least binding form of human commitment). But,
as noted earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a
separate prohibition on campaign “pledges or promises,” which
is not challenged here. The proposition that judges feel significantly greater compulsion, or appear to feel significantly greater
compulsion, to maintain consistency with nonpromissory statements made during a judicial campaign than with such
statements made before or after the campaign is not selfevidently true. It seems to us quite likely, in fact, that in many
cases the opposite is true. We doubt, for example, that a mere
statement of position enunciated during the pendency of an
election will be regarded by a judge as more binding—or as
more likely to subject him to popular disfavor if reconsidered—
than a carefully considered holding that the judge set forth in
an earlier opinion denying some individual’s claim to justice. In
any event, it suffices to say that respondents have not carried
the burden imposed by our strict-scrutiny test to establish this
proposition (that campaign statements are uniquely destructive
of open-mindedness) on which the validity of the announce
clause rests.
Moreover, the notion that the special context of
electioneering justifies an abridgment of the right to speak out
on disputed issues sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on
its head. “[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates” is “at the
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core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,” not at the edges. . . . “It is simply not the function of
government to select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in the course of a political campaign.” We have never
allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an election.23

In a footnote, the majority acknowledged that:
[T]he announce clause “serves the State’s interest in maintaining both the appearance of [a] form of impartiality [in regard to
parties to a proceeding] and its actuality.” . . . Some of the
speech prohibited by the announce clause may well exhibit a
bias against parties—including Justice Stevens’s example of an
election speech stressing the candidate’s unbroken record of
affirming convictions for rape. That is why we are careful to say
that the announce clause is “barely tailored to serve that
interest” . . . The question under our strict scrutiny test, however, is not whether the announce clause serves this interest at
all, but whether it is narrowly tailored to serve this interest. It
is not.24

In dissent, Justice Ginsberg, after discussing the undisputed
and continuing vitality of Minnesota’s “[no] pledges and promises
clause,” made the following observations:
The constitutionality of the pledges or promises clause is
thus amply supported; the provision not only advances due
process of law for litigants in Minnesota courts, it also reinforces the authority of the Minnesota judiciary by promoting
public confidence in the State’s judges. The Announce Clause,
however, is equally vital to achieving these compelling ends, for
without it, the pledges or promises provision would be feeble, an
arid form, a matter of no real importance.

23
Id. at 775–82 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (first
quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion); then
quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989); and
then quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
24
Id. at 777 n.7 (citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 801 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); and then quoting id. at 776 (majority opinion)). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that Minnesota
may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and
censure judges who violate these standards. What Minnesota may not do,
however, is censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for
themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial
officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters,
not the State.
Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges
or promises is easily circumvented. By prefacing a campaign
commitment with the caveat, “although I cannot promise anything,” or by simply avoiding the language of promises or
pledges altogether, a candidate could declare with impunity how
she would decide specific issues. Semantic sanitizing of the candidate’s commitment would not, however, diminish its pernicious
effects on actual and perceived judicial impartiality. To use the
Court’s example, a candidate who campaigns by saying, “If
elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power to prohibit
same-sex marriages” will feel scarcely more pressure to honor
that statement than the candidate who stands behind a podium
and tells a throng of cheering supporters: “I think it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.” Made
during a campaign, both statements contemplate a quid pro quo
between candidate and voter. Both effectively “bind [the candidate] to maintain that position after election.” And both convey
the impression of a candidate prejudging an issue to win votes.
Contrary to the Court’s assertion, the “nonpromissory” statement averts none of the dangers posed by the “promissory” one.
By targeting statements that do not technically constitute
pledges or promises but nevertheless “publicly mak[e] known
how [the candidate] would decide” legal issues, the Announce
Clause prevents this end run around the letter and spirit of its
companion provision. No less than the pledges or promises clause
itself, the Announce Clause is an indispensable part of Minnesota’s effort to maintain the health of its judiciary, and is
therefore constitutional for the same reasons.25

II. AFTER REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in White has
spurred significant commentary and controversy among, inter
alia, courts, disciplinary bodies, and scholars attempting to
balance “the competing goals of informed voter decision making,
vigorous competition, and judicial impartiality that together
frame the debate over the regulation of judicial election campaigns.”26 For the most part, as noted, “state courts have revised
their canons, including provisions not at issue in White, to make
them less restrictive. . . . [But others] have rejected First Amend25

Id. at 819–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)
(first quoting id. at 780 (majority opinion); then quoting id. at 779; then quoting id.
at 770; and then quoting Kelly, 247 F.3d at 881–82).
26
Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 187 (2004).

76

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:67

ment challenges to the restrictions on judicial campaign and
partisan political activities that the canons impose.”27
In New York, the Court of Appeals has applied the holding of
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White narrowly, rejecting constitutional attacks on other, related canons.28 An excellent summary of the Court of Appeals’ treatment of permissible and
impermissible campaign statements is set forth in a 2013 law
review article.29 The aforementioned law review article notes
that:
White had a nationwide impact on state judicial conduct
codes. . . . In the aftermath of White, the New York Court of Appeals decided Matter of Shanley. The petitioner sought review
of a decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct (“Commission”) concerning “campaign literature in
which she [had] identified herself as a ‘Law and order
Candidate.’ ”
“In the Commission’s view, the phrase created the appearance that petitioner would favor the prosecution, and amounted
to an impermissible pledge as to how she would decide cases.”
According to widely held perceptions, “the phrase promises
stern treatment of criminal defendants.” The Court of Appeals
disagreed with the result, finding that the phrase did not
compromise judicial impartiality. “ ‘Law and order’ is a phrase
widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and
election campaigns. We decline to treat it as a ‘commit[ment]’ or a
‘pledge[ ] or promise[ ] of conduct in office.’ ”
The next year the Court of Appeals decided Matter of
Watson. In the course of his campaign for judicial office, William
Watson sent a letter to law enforcement personnel asking them
to “put a real prosecutor on the bench.” Watson indicated in a
newspaper advertisement that “he had ‘proven experience in the
war against crime.’ ” Watson also made a statement to a reporter indicating that he would reduce court caseloads by cracking
down on crime, causing criminals to go elsewhere.
The Court of Appeals identified tension with White, finding
the pledges or promises clause at issue in the case “sufficiently
circumscribed” to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The
27

Id. at 183 (footnotes omitted).
See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188 (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95MFYDY] (“New York State appellate courts have considered, and rejected, claims that
certain judicial conduct rules prohibiting partisan political activity impermissibly
restrict a judge’s freedom of speech . . . or are unconstitutionally vague.”).
29
Noah Hertz-Bunzl, Pledge, Promise, or Commit: New York’s Tenuous Limitations on Judicial Campaign Speech, 29 TOURO L. REV. 569, 569 (2013).
28
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clause is limited because it “precludes only those statements of
intention that single out a party or class of litigants for special
treatment” or convey a candidate will behave inconsistently
with their judicial duties, leaving permissible “most statements
identifying a point of view.”
[S]tatements that merely express a viewpoint do not
amount to promises of future conduct. On the other hand,
candidates need not preface campaign statements with the
phrase “I promise” before their remarks may reasonably be
interpreted by the public as a pledge to act or rule in a
particular way if elected. A candidate’s statements must be
reviewed in their totality and in the context of the campaign as a whole to determine whether the candidate has
unequivocally articulated a pledge or promise of future
conduct . . . .
Here, Watson violated this rule by expressing a bias in favor of
the police and implying he would use his powers to keep certain
kinds of defendants out of the city, and did so repeatedly
throughout the campaign.
In 2009, the Commission considered charges against [a
judge] stemming from her election campaign for New York City
Civil Court. [In her campaign, the judge] had released literature advertising a planned lecture that stated, “[she] and
Veteran Tenant Attorney Steven DeCastro will show you how
to stick up for your rights, beat your landlord, . . . and win in
court!”
The Commission identified violations of the pledges, promises, and commitments clauses.
[The candidate’s] literature may have given prospective
voters the impression that she would favor tenants over
landlords in housing matters, which are often the subject of
Civil Court proceedings. By distributing such literature,
which appeared to commit herself with respect to issues
likely to come before her court, she compromised her
impartiality.
***
In 2010, the Commission considered written complaints
against Rensselaer County Supreme Court Justice Patrick J.
McGrath for a letter he sent during his campaign to pistol permit
holders. The text of the letter stated the following:
As your County Judge for the past 14 years, I have been
responsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County. My
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pistol permit is very important to me as I know yours is to
you. . . .
....
As Supreme Court Justice . . . I will still be responsible
for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County.
The Commission found that the statements conveyed bias to
favor pistol permit holders and their interests, reinforcing an
implied promise that he would look after their interests and
thus violated the rule against improper pledges, promises, and
commitments. “Campaign statements that single out a particular
class of litigants for special treatment are inconsistent with
judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality . . . .”
The Commission made a number of decisions on similar
issues prior to White. In the following three instances, the Commission found a violation of the “pledges and promises” and
“commit or appear to commit” clauses. Matter of Birnbaum involved a brochure that “asserted that voters had a ‘clear choice’
between respondent . . . a tenant, and his opponent . . . a landlord.” The “literature gave the unmistakable impression that he
would favor tenants over landlords in housing matters.”
Matter of Hafner, Jr. involved literature “that stated: ‘Are
you tired of seeing career criminals get a ‘slap’ on the wrist? So
am I’ ” and the phrase, referring to an opponent, that “[s]oft
judges make hard criminals!” The literature implied respondent “would deal harshly with all such defendants, rather than
judge the merits of individual cases.” Matter of LaCava involved a letter sent to Right-to-Life Party members in which the
candidate “asserted his ‘commitment to the sanctity of life from
the moment of conception’ ” and an interview with a reporter in
which the candidate stated that abortion is murder. This statement “created the appearance” that LaCava “might not follow
constitutional and statutory law if called upon to do so.”30

30
Id. at 572–76 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re
Shanley, 98 N.Y.2d 310, 311–13 (2002) (per curiam); then quoting In re Watson, 100
N.Y.2d 290, 296, 298, 303 (2003) (per curiam); then quoting In re Chan (N.Y.
Comm’n Jud. Conduct Nov. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 4929370, at *2–3; then quoting In re
McGrath (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Feb. 5, 2010), 2010 WL 597261, at *1, *3; then
quoting In re Birnbaum (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Sept. 29, 1997), 1997 WL
640687, at *1–2; then quoting In re Hafner (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Dec. 29,
2000), 2000 WL 33172938, at *1–2; and then quoting In re La Cava (N.Y. Comm’n
Jud. Conduct Sept. 16, 1999), 1999 WL 994135, at *1–2). The article posits that
Ultimately the key distinction in New York is that a statement is
unlawful when it favors a single class of litigants. Under this rubric,
William Watson and Walter Hafner violated the rule by favoring law
enforcement over criminal defendants. [The New York City Civil Court
candidate] and Arthur Birnbaum violated the rule by favoring tenants over
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The article then summarized the status of pledge, promise,
or commit clauses across the nation since White:
The vast majority of states that have judicial elections have
some form of a pledge, promise, or commit clause in their
canons of judicial conduct. The constitutionality of such clauses
after White has been the subject of litigation in other states.
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the clauses. Other
courts have upheld the clauses with narrow constructions. A
number of federal district courts have found the provisions to be
unconstitutional, on their face or as applied. Some federal
appellate courts have rejected challenges to the clauses based
on ripeness or standing grounds. The general consensus among
the scholarship is that [even] the promises clauses are on shaky
ground after White.31

The Court of Appeals also upheld the political activity canons
in Matter of Raab. There, the court distinguished between a candidate’s activities on his own behalf, which were permissible, and
activities on behalf of other candidates, which were not, and
otherwise found the canons narrowly tailored to preserve the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.32
In a 2006 article analyzing the impact of White, Robert
Tembeckjian, Administrator and Counsel to New York’s Judicial
Conduct Commission, suggested that statements which are permissible during a campaign may later require disqualification
and that the failure to disqualify might lead to discipline.33 He
also reiterated Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that the exclusion
of explicit words of pledge or promise from a statement does not
render an otherwise impermissible statement permissible:
As the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White take hold, and candidates for judicial office speak more freely, will judges more
frequently be disqualified from hearing certain cases because
their impartiality has been compromised by things they said on
the campaign trail?
***

landlords. Patrick McGrath violated this rule by favoring the interests of
gun-owners over the interests of non gun-owners.
Id. at 582 (footnotes omitted).
31
Id. at 578.
32
100 N.Y.2d 305, 315–16 (2003).
33
Robert H. Tembeckjian, Campaign Speech and the Administration of Justice,
N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 29, 2006), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f2ed6214-ce774f81-8a0a-5924c0765ff1/ (login required).
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A related code provision, the “disqualification rule,” requires a judge to recuse in any case where the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where
the judge, while a candidate, made a public statement that
commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to an
issue in the proceeding, the controversy itself and, in some
jurisdictions, the parties or a class of parties. In his concurring
opinion in White, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the
states may adopt disqualification standards more rigorous than
due process requires and may discipline judges who violate
those standards.
***
What is really going on here is not so much a grand
constitutional debate as an issue-driven political agenda. Many
of the post-White federal lawsuits challenging the code have
been brought by Right-to-Life organizations, whose goal seems
to be to loosen the constraints on judicial candidates so that a
more ideologically pure group of candidates would be identified
and elected. In Alaska, where a lawsuit challenging the code
has been commenced, the judicial council advised judicial
candidates not to answer certain issue-driven questionnaires.
The Alaska Right to Life organization then sent out a fundraising appeal stating, “Alaska Right to Life is in dire need of
PAC funding to accomplish the goals of changing the makeup of
the courts by removing bad judges.”
What may be a “bad judge” to Alaska Right to Life is probably not what would be a “bad judge” to Alaska abortion rights
advocates, but I would be offended by such tactics from either
side of the abortion issue. When Right to Life wins one, they
simultaneously open the door to Pro-Choice groups using the
same tactics to put their people on the bench. What is good for
one side will be good for the other. It just won’t be good for
public confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary
or the administration of justice.
***
If a campaigning judge is permitted to make promises with
respect to cases or controversies, will that judge’s impartiality
reasonably be questioned should that case or controversy come
before him or her on the bench? In my view, depending on the
specifics of the particular situation, the answer will increasingly
be “yes,” and the judge will have to recuse.
For example, I believe under White judicial candidates may
say, “I have always believed life begins at conception.” But I do
not believe White permits candidates to say, “If an abortion case
comes before me, I will rule in favor of the unborn child.” Such
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a statement would likely result in discipline under the “pledges
or promises” clause. Yet even if there were no such clause, this
pledge-making candidate could not preside over an abortion
rights case because, under the disqualification rule, he or she
would have made a campaign statement that did or appeared to
commit to a party or a result. Substitute “pro-choice” for “right
to-life” in this example, and you get the same awful result.34
Other campaign statements may not violate the rules so
clearly. If that same candidate were to say, “I am right-to-life,
and if an abortion case comes before me, you can count on me to
do the right thing,” my work as a disciplinary enforcer would be
set in motion. Was this a disguised and prohibited “pledge” or
“promise”?
If the present trend continues, and federal courts invalidate the “pledges or promises” clause while affirming the
disqualification rule, the Right-to-Life groups bringing suit will
have created new work for disciplinary enforcers, work we do
not want on an issue we would prefer were not there, but work
we will be obliged to undertake. We could not let judges off the
hook for presiding over cases in which their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. But our factual inquiry would be a
complex and delicate balancing act as we try to find the truth
without becoming the “thought police.” And we would not be
alone. Appellate courts would increasingly be forced to rule on
claims that a lower court ruling was tainted by the judge’s lack
of impartiality, owing to pledges or promises made during the
judge’s campaign.35

34

In Mr. Tembeckjian’s hypothetical example, the candidate would, in any
event, be guilty of violating multiple ethics rules: He promised/pledged a result;
committed to a “case or controversy”; demonstrated bias in favor of a party; and
suggested that he would not follow the law. Id. Clearly, therefore, the candidate,
after election, would also be disqualified. Mr. Tembeckjian’s otherwise excellent
article also asserts that disqualification would be required because the judge, while
a candidate, “appeared to commit to a party or result.” Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, the Rules governing the Conduct of Judges were amended in February 2006
to delete the provision which precluded candidates from making “statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court . . . .” 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS.
§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii) (2006) (alterations omitted). Mr. Tembeckjian’s article was published in November 2006. Tembeckjian, supra note 33. Although Mr. Tembeckjian’s
statement is consistent with his earlier reference to Justice Kennedy’s assertion that
recusal standards may be more rigorous than due process requires, any reliance on
the “appear[s] to commit” language of a defunct rule is problematic.
35
Tembeckjian, supra note 33 (footnote omitted).

82

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:67

III. OPINIONS OF THE ACJE AFTER WHITE
In Opinion 15-71 of the ACJE, the inquiring judge, a candidate
for election/re-election, was invited by a non-profit advocacy
group to participate in a screening process to be evaluated for the
group’s endorsement in the upcoming election.36 Concerned about
disclosing a position that might compromise the judge’s oath “to
be ‘unbiased, fair and impartial,’ ”37 the inquirer sought advice
from the committee, which responded as follows:
[T]he Committee believes the inquiring judicial candidate may
express his/her own personal views on matters related to
abortion during the interview process with the organization in
question, provided the candidate does not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of office, or improper
commitments regarding cases, controversies, or issues likely to
come before the court. If the inquiring candidate chooses to
share his/her views on the subject of abortion in an interview
with the advocacy organization, he/she should also make clear
that he/she will decide all cases fairly and impartially and in
accordance with governing law.
The candidate also may not agree to any unacceptable “conditions” to the endorsement or support, such as a request that the
candidate decline endorsement by particular organizations or
political parties, or a request to make a pledge or promise of
conduct in office inconsistent with the impartial performance of
adjudicative duties.
Finally, it is noted that, if the inquiring candidate believes
the organization is attempting to pressure him/her into making
an improper pledge or promise, the candidate may, if he/she
wishes, direct the organization’s attention to section 100.3(E)(1)(f),
which would require disqualification in certain matters if the
candidate acquiesced in the organization’s request.38

The ACJE has also added cautionary notes to several opinions decided prior to White, noting the absence of an announce
clause in New York and indicating that candidates could not
articulate their views on legal issues.39
36
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-71 (June 11, 2015),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-71.htm [https://perma.cc/4LLBBBRJ].
37
Id.
38
Id. (citations omitted); see 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.3(E)(1)(f) (2020).
39
See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 93-99 (Dec. 9, 1993),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/93-99.htm [https://perma.cc/4Q56ED6Q] (candidate may not answer questions designed to elicit the candidate’s views
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The ACJE opined that a judicial candidate could not “answer
a political party’s questionnaire designed to elicit express and
implied commitments that (a) are unrelated to the impartial
performance of judicial duties and/or (b) would require him/her to
engage in activities prohibited by the Rules Governing Judicial
Conduct.”40 Some of the questions included:
• “Will you pledge to fight any attempts to roll back the
reproductive protections afforded women by Roe v. Wade?”
• “Would you commit to supporting state funding for [P]lanned
Parenthood services should the federal government no
longer allow any federal dollars to be used for its health care
services? And would you vocally oppose any federal proposal that cuts federal funding for Planned Parenthood?”
• “Will you oppose any attempts to limit [Social Security and
Medicare] to reduce the federal deficit?”
• “Will you fight back any attempts to repeal the [Affordable
Care Act]?”41

The Committee responded as follows:
In general, a judicial candidate may personally participate
in his/her own judicial campaign during the designated window
period, subjection to limitations. For example, the campaign
must be conducted consistent with the judiciary’s impartiality,
integrity and independence, and all campaign statements must
be entirely truthful and not in any way misleading. Also, a judicial candidate may not make pledges or promises of conduct in
office at odds with impartial performance of judicial duties nor

or pledges on particular controversial issues or concerning whether the judge would
accept the nomination of some other party); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op.
93-52 (Oct. 28, 1993), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/93-52.htm
[https://perma.cc/KL66-MAV8] (candidate may accept endorsement of Right to Life
party but “should not . . . manifest an acceptance of the principles of the party in any
other fashion”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 90-67 (June 7, 1990),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/90-67.htm [https://perma.cc/M367C4H2] (a judge running for re-election may, during the campaign, refer to his or her
previous decisions, and comment on an opponent’s qualifications, but may not
comment on disputed legal or political issues). In some recent opinions, the
committee has continued to cite to older opinions that pre-date White for the
proposition that “accepting a party’s nomination ‘does not necessarily require
acceptance of that party’s goals, positions, or platform.’ ” N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud.
Ethics, Op. 14-113 (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/
14-113.htm [https://perma.cc/84ED-FDMC]. Inasmuch as candidates can announce
their views, however, the importance of this statement is unclear.
40
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 18-95 (May 10, 2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/18-95.htm [https://perma.cc/XZ9R8NFV].
41
Id. (second and third alterations in original).
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make improper promises about controversies, cases, or issues
likely to come before the court.
Applying these principles, we have advised that a judicial
candidate may not promise to set up and fund a legal scholarship if elected, as this “is a pledge or promise entirely unrelated
to the ‘faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties’ and
thus impermissible.” Nor may a candidate sign a political organization’s pledge to support and endorse all other candidates
endorsed by the organization and to consult with it on any
appointments when in public office. We have also advised that
a judicial candidate must not promise to abolish the lawful and
accepted practice of plea bargaining in criminal cases in his/her
court if elected.
Here, too, we conclude that the candidate may not respond
to this questionnaire as it seeks commitments that are inconsistent with and/or unrelated to the impartial performance of
judicial duties. We note the party’s questionnaire does not in any
way acknowledge a judge’s obligation to “decide all cases fairly
and impartially and in accordance with governing law” and does
not invite candidates to assert any caveats when responding to
its yes/no questions.42

The opinion goes on to note “that the candidate, if elected or
re-elected, would not be ethically permitted to fulfill many, or
perhaps most, of the express and implied promises the questionnaire elicits.”43
42

Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op.
03-28 (Aug. 12, 2004), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/03-28_.htm
[https://perma.cc/NK3V-REW5]; and then quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud.
Ethics, Op. 15-71 (June 11, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/
15-71.htm [https://perma.cc/4LLB-BBRJ]).
43
Id. (“For example, although a sitting judge may make recommendations to
public and private fund-granting organizations on ‘projects and programs concerning
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice’ (22 NYCRR
100.4(C)(3)(b)(iii)), he/she generally may not publicly support increased or continued
funding for other purposes (compare e.g. Opinions 12-58 [appropriations for a fire
company]; 03-38 [ballot proposition to secure funding for a library]; 00-33 [library
bond proposition]; 95-02 [appropriations for a public library] with Opinions 18-08
[appropriations for a problem-solving court]; 07-109 [bond measure for a new
courthouse]). As another example, while a judge may be able to convey ‘facts
personally known’ concerning ‘the fitness of a nominee under consideration for an
appointive [federal] judgeship’ to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee
(Opinion 93-22), a judge who publicly opposes a U.S. Supreme Court nominee based
solely on the nominee’s views on abortion or other such controversial policy issues
would likely be seen as engaging in partisan political activity (see 22 NYCRR
100.5(A)(1) [a judge must not ‘directly or indirectly engage in any political activity’
except as expressly permitted]; cf. Opinion 17-38 [a judge may not call a Senate
Committee to express an opinion on a pending federal executive branch appointment]). Further, while a judge has an ethical obligation to adjudicate cases and
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IV. THE TREATMENT OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON
CANDIDATES AS COMPARED WITH JUDGES
In the course of undertaking this analysis, it occurred to me
that I had routinely conflated the speech restrictions on judges
with the speech restrictions on candidates. Certainly, most of the
rules applicable to judges who are not candidates are equally
applicable to candidates, regardless of whether they are judges.44
And some inquiring judges, who were not candidates for election
or re-election, have challenged the speech restrictions contained
within, or arising out of, the canons relying on White.45
It will be remembered that White dealt with the validity of
the announce clause, which was applicable only to candidates for
judicial office. However, the majority opinion suggested that under
the Minnesota canons, the speech rights of judges not seeking
election/re-election, were greater than the speech rights of candidates, precisely because the announce clause was applicable to
the latter and not to the former, and that this caused an absurd
result, to wit, that what the candidate could not properly
announce the day prior to his election, he could properly
announce the day after his election.46
By parity of reasoning, in New York, where there is no
announce clause, an argument could be made that subject to
compliance with other rules, and accounting for any variations in
the treatment of judges and candidates stemming from the
difference in their positions, judicial versus non-judicial, judges
and candidates should, under White, be treated similarly in their
announcement of views. Nevertheless, that has not been the case.
In this regard, non-candidate judges in New York must avoid

controversies that are properly before him/her, without being ‘swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism’ (22 NYCRR 100.3(B)(1)), the promise to
fight for a particular side of a politically controversial issue is inconsistent with the
role of a neutral arbiter and would insert the judge ‘unnecessarily into public
controversy’ (Opinion 17-38). Thus, the questionnaire is also impermissible to the
extent it purports to require the candidate to engage in activities prohibited by the
Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.”).
44
For purposes of clarity, “judges” here will be used to refer to judges who are
not candidates for election or re-election and “candidates” will refer to judges and
non-judge candidates for election or re-election.
45
See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188 (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95MFYDY]; N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 16-85 (June 16, 2016),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/16-85.htm [https://perma.cc/H4SSFPZX].
46
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002).
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speaking on controversial issues; in effect, they are not permitted
to announce their views.
Irrespective of whether such a distinction is supportable in
law and logic, it will be helpful to examine the specific rules from
which the speech restrictions on judges and candidates derive.
A.

Speech Restrictions on Judges and Candidates in New York

The following is a synopsis of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts which directly or indirectly imposes speech
restrictions on judges and candidates:
• Section 100.2, applicable to judges only, requires judges to
“avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” and
to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”
and “not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance . . . private interests . . . .”47
• Section 100.3, applicable to judges only, requires judges: to
“perform the duties of judicial office impartially and
diligently,” “without bias or prejudice” or manifesting bias
or prejudice; to refrain from commenting on “pending or
impending” cases in the United States or its territories;
“disqualify himself or herself” where “the judge has personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts” or where the judge,
either as candidate or judge, “made a pledge or promise . . . inconsistent with the impartial performance of . . .
duties” or a “public statement . . . that commits the judge”
with respect to an issue or the parties in a proceeding.48
• Section 100.4, applicable to judges only, requires judges to
conduct extra-judicial activities in a manner that minimizes
the risk of conflict with judicial obligations so that judges
are not to engage in such activities that “(1) cast reasonable
doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge;
(2) detract from the dignity of judicial office; or (3) interfere
with the proper performance of judicial duties and are not
incompatible with judicial office.”49
• Section 100.5 governs the political activities of judges and
candidates, restricting the political rights of judges who are
not candidates for office and expanding them only when
they are running for office. The section also effectively
restricts the political rights of non-judge candidates running

47
48
49

22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.2(A), (C) (2020).
Id. § 100.3(B)(4), (8), (E)(1)(a)(ii), (f).
Id. § 100.4(A)(1)–(3).
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for judicial office: Judges and candidates for judicial office
are not, except as permitted by the rules, allowed to engage
in any political activity, except in connection with their own
campaigns (as provided in this section) or on behalf of “the
law, the legal system [and] the administration of justice.”50
Although not explicitly stated, presumably, some “political”
activities on behalf of the judge’s personal interests, which
do not involve use of the judge’s office or title, are also
permissible (as the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics
opinions advise).51
• Under section 100.5(A)(4)(a), judges and candidates are
required to “maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial
office and act in a manner consistent with the impartiality,
integrity and independence of the judiciary” and under
section 100.5(A)(4)(d), “shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the
office; [or] (ii) with respect to cases, controversies or issues
that are likely to come before the court, make commitments
that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office.”52
• Section 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii) prohibits judges and candidates
from “knowingly” making “false statement[s].”53
• Relatedly, section 100.3(E) concerns disqualification and
generally requires disqualification where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, but more specifically
mirrors the above provisions, requiring disqualification
where the judge has a “bias or prejudice concerning a party”
or has, while a judge or candidate, “made a pledge or
promise of conduct . . . inconsistent with the impartial
performance” of “duties” or a “public statement” committing

50

Id. § 100.5(A)(1)–(2).
See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 18-164 (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/18-164.htm [https://perma.cc/57PNL4RL] (permitting “[a] judicial candidate who is part of a political party’s slate” to attend
a fundraising event where the judge was a candidate); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud.
Ethics, Op. 98-99 (Sept. 10, 1998), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/
98-99.htm [https://perma.cc/X62G-HYV4] (holding that “[a] judge may circulate . . . petitions for a slate of candidates from [a] political party only if the judge’s name is also
on the petition as a nominee”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 89-43 (Apr. 4,
1989), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/89-43.htm [https://perma.cc/
YMY3-GZY8] (allowing a town justice to serve as master of ceremonies at a
fundraiser for an event held by the judge’s own political party).
52
22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.5(A)(4)(a), (d)(i)–(ii).
53
Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii).
51
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“the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the proceeding” or
“parties or controversy in the proceeding.”54

Accordingly, judges and candidates for judicial office are required to: maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office; act
in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity, and independence of the judiciary; refrain from making commitments
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to
come before the court; and avoid political activity except for
participating in their own campaigns as provided in the rules or
on behalf of the law, legal system, or administration of justice.
As demonstrated, the only significant differences between the
treatment of judges and candidates in the rules concern the
restrictions on judges to refrain from commenting on pending or
impending cases in the United States and its territories and
using the prestige of judicial office to further private interests.55
B. Restrictions on Judges from Involvement in Public
Controversies
The ACJE has frequently opined that judges should not “enter
a public controversy on a matter that goes beyond the judge’s
strictly private interest,”56 become “associated with matters that

54

Id. § 100.3(E)(1).
Section 100.2 requires judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety . . . .” Id. § 100.2. Underlying this canon is the requirement that judges
act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. Section 100.4 requires judges to avoid activities that “cast reasonable
doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially . . . .” Id. § 100.4(A)(1). Although
there are no identically worded mandates applicable to candidates, the requirement
of acting in a manner consistent with the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary
is imposed on candidates by Rule 100.5. See id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d).
56
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 04-123 (Dec. 2, 2004),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/04-123_.htm [https://perma.cc/AEP3DZAN] (“A judge should not write a letter to a public official of the county that states
the judge’s position on a legal question growing out of the judge’s former role as a
county legislator when the proposed letter, which is likely to become public, relates
to a substantial political controversy; and, in addition, the controversy is likely to
lead to litigation.”).
55
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are the subject of litigation or public controversy,”57 or “insert”
him or herself “unnecessarily into public controversy.”58
In other opinions, the ACJE has advised against activities of
judges that involved joining or being appointed to boards of
organizations or
committees that focus on “political or controversial issues,” such
as a committee that will recommend revisions to the town code;
local school boards; zoning or planning boards; a regional council dealing with the management of policies affecting natural

57

N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-70 (May 4, 2017),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-70.htm [https://perma.cc/QF8TA7D3] (“A court attorney-referee who is an ordained rabbi may teach, preach, and
write on Israel-related issues concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, but not on non-legal matters of substantial public and political
controversy, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”).
58
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-38 (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-38.htm [https://perma.cc/C6ABK789] (A judge should not participate in the march for science “unless the judge
determines (a) the march is not co-sponsored by or affiliated with any political organization; (b) the march does not support or oppose any political party or candidate
for election; (c) the judge’s participation will not involve the judge in impermissible
political activity; and (d) the judge’s participation will not insert him/her unnecessarily into public controversy.”). As alluded to above, generally, “a judge may
publicly express . . . views on a variety of issues that affect him/her personally and
directly, in his/her capacity ‘as a private citizen whose personal interests will be
affected’ but must avoid public comment on controversial subjects that ‘do not
directly affect the judge’s interests.’ ” N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 13178 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/13-178.htm
[https://perma.cc/GUA4-UYFJ] (first quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics,
Op. 08-33 (Mar. 13, 2008), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/0833.htm [https://perma.cc/EA2T-KRYR]; and then quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on
Jud. Ethics, Op. 02-41 (June 7, 2002), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/
02-41.htm [https://perma.cc/ HFU2-XZS7]) (“A judge who owns a home in a multiunit building may publicly express his/her views on a proposal by building
maintenance employees to unionize, provided the judge does so in his/her capacity as
a private citizen and does not use judicial stationery or otherwise refer to his/her
judicial office.”). The rationale for the committee’s consistent approval of judges’
statements made as “private citizen[s]” on matters that “affect the judge’s interests”
is not entirely clear, but it appears to derive from what has been explicitly
prohibited by several rules. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.2(C) (“A
judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests . . . .”); Id. § 100.4(C)(1) (“A . . . judge shall not appear at public hearing . . . except on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice
or except when acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge’s interests.”
(italics added)); Id. § 100.3(B)(8) (The prohibition against commenting publicly on
pending or impending litigation “does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is
a litigant in a personal capacity.”). Relatedly, the ancient maxim in law is that
“everything which is not forbidden is allowed.”

90

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:67

resources; and a town’s Water Advisory Committee where there
was a substantial likelihood that the committee would be involved in matters of public controversy.59

In Opinion 99-74, the ACJE opined that a “part-time town
justice should not accept [an] appointment to the town’s Water
Advisory Committee if there is a substantial likelihood that the
committee will be involved in matters of public controversy.”60
Likewise, in Opinion 09-56, the committee recommended that,
although a judge could continue membership in a local chapter of
Shooters’ Committee on Political Education, he or she could not
serve on its board.61 Similarly, the ACJE opined that a judge
could be a member of Planned Parenthood and the New York
Civil Liberties Union “provided that such membership does not
involve the judge in litigated matters or publicly associates the
judge with organizational positions on matters of public
controversy.”62
More recently, in Opinion 15-188, the ACJE declined to
reconsider prior opinions in which it advised that judges could
not “take part in certain public activities regarding redistricting,”
stating:
Th[e] historical context makes clear that a judge’s publicly
weighing in on such sharply contested and highly politicized
issues would violate the rule barring a judge from directly or
indirectly engaging in partisan political activity. Legislative redistricting is not related to “the law, the legal system or the
administration of justice” in any conventional sense or meaning
those terms have in the judicial ethics field or context. To the
contrary, redistricting is generally perceived as an exercise of
legislative or political power. Therefore, a judge’s voluntary
involvement with redistricting would readily create an appearance that he/she was using the prestige of judicial office to
59
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 11-68 (June 16, 2011),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/11-68.htm [https://perma.cc/ZH8HNRFF] (citations omitted).
60
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 99-74 (Apr. 29, 1999),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/99-74_.htm [https://perma.cc/9SFGNDXA].
61
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 09-56 (Mar. 12, 2009),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/09-56.htm [https://perma.cc/QG2YNH2W].
62
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 98-101 (Sept. 10, 1998),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/98-101_.htm [https://perma.cc/JV6JA8KP]; see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. Jud. on Ethics, Op. 98-74 (June 19, 1998),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/98-74_.htm [https://perma.cc/4N8D5L6M] (judge should not serve on board of a local Right to Life organization).
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advance the private and/or political interests of others and could
cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially
as a judge.
As the Court of Appeals stated:
litigants have a right guaranteed under the Due Process
Clause to a fair and impartial magistrate and the State, as
the steward of the judicial system, has the obligation to
create such a forum and prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, including political bias or favoritism.
The importance of these fundamental precepts in maintaining public confidence in the judicial system is firmly
established: “the State has an overriding interest in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary . . . ”
These fundamental precepts firmly underlie this Committee’s continuing concern over the engagement of judges in
partisan political issues or on matters of great public controversy that are likely to raise reasonable questions about a
judge’s ability to be fair and impartial. This reasoning clearly
excludes a judge from advocating for passage of a redistricting
amendment, and from moderating or participating in a panel
discussion concerning redistricting. Moreover, to the extent redistricting is primarily a legislative function, the Committee
believes a judge’s public extra-judicial involvement in debates
concerning redistricting could raise serious separation-ofpowers concerns.63

In sum, in several of the above-referenced opinions, the
ACJE recommended against making statements on one or more
of the following bases—that the subject matter was controversial
or likely to lead to litigation, that the statements would involve
the judge in impermissible political activity, would raise questions about the judge’s impartiality or use the prestige of judicial
63

N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188, (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95MFYDY] (first quoting 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.5(A)(1)(iii); and then
quoting In re Raab, 100 N.Y.2d 305, 313 (N.Y. 2003)); see also N.Y. COMP. RULES &
REGS. § 100.0(S) (“An independent judiciary is one free of outside influences or
control.”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 01-127 (Jan. 24, 2002),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/01-127.htm [https://perma.cc/FMX4Q4T9] (noting that a town judge’s exercise of the powers and duties of the town clerk
would “raise serious questions concerning the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 01-65
(June 27, 2001), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/01-65_.htm
[https://perma.cc/7X9L-HEPH] (noting that it is inappropriate for a judge to be
directly or indirectly involved in “partisan political issues” or “matters of public
controversy”).
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office to further private interests, or were otherwise incompatible
with judicial office. The opinions were issued both before and after
the elimination of New York’s announce clause and the Supreme
Court’s decision in White.
As indicated, in support of the prohibition against involvement in public controversy, the ACJE has relied largely on
section 100.4(A)(3) of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the
Courts, which forbids extra-judicial conduct that is incompatible
with judicial office; section 100.4(A)(1), which forbids conduct that
casts reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially
as a judge; and section 100.4(a)(2), which precludes conduct that
detracts from judicial office.64 Although section 100.4 is by its
terms applicable to judges only, the same essential restrictions
are applicable to candidates as set forth in section 100.5’s
mandates to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office
and to act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity,
and independence of the judiciary.
The point is this: the provisions that the ACJE relies upon to
restrict judges’ speech—not rules related to political activity, but
rules that are essentially identical to rules that are also applicable to candidates where those candidates are free to announce
their views—provide ample grounds to question some of the
reasoning in opinions restricting the speech rights of judges.65
V. THE REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY IN NEW YORK
One of the significant issues discussed in White concerns the
meaning of impartiality. Justice Scalia identified three possible
definitions of impartiality and concluded that the announce

64

See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
It does not appear to me that the voters’ “right to know,” which was
referenced in White, can alone support differential treatment between judges and
candidates in view of the specific wording of the rules and common sense. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 862 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). The following statement of
the argument illustrates the problem:
• Judges cannot engage in conduct that is incompatible with judicial office.
• Judges are barred from announcing their views on controversial issues
because that is incompatible with judicial office.
• The rules that apply to judges also apply to candidates, so that
candidates, like judges, cannot engage in conduct that is incompatible
with judicial office.
• Candidates are free to announce their views on controversial issues,
despite the fact that it is incompatible with judicial office, because the
voters’ right to know is paramount.
65
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clause was not narrowly tailored to advance any of them.66 He
also appears to have adopted, in dicta, a narrow definition of
impartiality, limited to a lack of bias for or against a party to a
proceeding.67 In doing so, he distinguished that definition from
“open-mindedness,” which he concluded was not the purpose for
which the announce clause was adopted in Minnesota.68 This
point bears further discussion as it may be possible under the
New York Rules to announce one’s views on disputed issues in a
way that nevertheless violates other rules, including the rules
that mandate impartiality, which are applicable to judges and
candidates.69
There are fourteen references in the New York Rules
Governing the Conduct of Judges to “impartial,” “impartially,” or
“impartiality.”70 “Impartiality” is defined in the terminology section of the rules as denoting the “absence of bias or prejudice in
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as
well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may
come before the judge,”71 which is broader than Justice Scalia’s
definition.
Perhaps, it is true that in many cases a judge will not have
preconceptions on law, and it is ideal that the judge have no predisposition on the merits of a case, but it is not possible in every
conceivable case. Moreover, it is certainly not ideal in every case
to have a judge with no preconceptions on law; nor is it ideal to
have a judge with moral beliefs that are entirely consistent with
law.
So, what does impartiality mean? Extrapolating from the
definition of impartiality in the New York Rules, it means, in
addition to the lack of bias, that despite any preconceptions on
law, or having other competing moral beliefs or principles, the
judge can lay those aside and rule fairly and impartially. That is,
66

White, 536 U.S. at 775–78.
Id. at 775–77; see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 246–47 (Carolina Acad. Press, 5th ed. 2016) (1990).
68
White, 536 U.S. at 778.
69
See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 67, at 240–41 (“The best one can say is
that a judge’s statement of a position on an issue will not in itself justify an
inference of bias for or against a party. However, accompanying circumstances might
justify an inference of bias. Such circumstances include, among others, language
used by the judge in stating [his or her] position, whether the judge has referred to
the specific case, and whether the statement has been addressed to a party in the
case.”).
70
See generally 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS §§ 100.0–.5 (2020).
71
Id. § 100.0(R) (emphasis added).
67
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the judge, in performing his or her duties impartially, follows the
law and can be swayed by evidence and argument to a position
contrary to what he or she preconceived. Stated in yet another
way, to be impartial would be to acknowledge the primacy of the
adversarial process and the need to adhere to the law. This is
true whether the judge is shown that his or her preconceptions or
beliefs are wrong, or, more, even if the judge’s preconceptions and
beliefs are not wrong, that the principle of adherence to the law
takes precedence.72
With this foundation in mind, a lack of impartiality means
that the judge not only has preconceptions of law or fact or other
beliefs that conflict with the law, but that he or she cannot, or
will not, lay them aside. In short, a non-impartial judge refuses
to accept the primacy of the adversarial process and need to
adhere to the law when those principles come into conflict with
the judge’s preconceptions or other beliefs.
VI. PLEDGES AND PROMISES, COMMITMENTS ON CASES
LIKELY TO COME BEFORE THE COURT
Other rules unaffected by White are restrictions on pledges
and promises and making commitments on cases likely to come
before the court. As noted, these rules are applicable to judges
and candidates.
The specific rules, as set out in section 100.5(A) of the Rules
of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, are that a judge or a nonjudge candidate running for election to judicial office shall not:
(i)

(ii)

make pledges or promises of conduct in office that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office; [or]
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
likely to come before the court, make commitments that
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office.73

VII. ANALYZING JUDICIAL CANDIDATE ANNOUNCEMENTS
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that when a judicial
candidate announces his or her personal views, that does not
necessarily indicate a lack of impartiality, meaning that the
72
In the event that the judge, in a particular matter, was unable to follow the
law owing to a moral conflict, then the judge could not continue presiding in the
matter.
73
Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d).
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judge’s preconceptions and moral beliefs would prevent the judge
from acknowledging and accepting both the primacy of the
adversarial process and need to adhere to the law. Nevertheless,
it is possible that some announcements of positions, depending
upon content and context, and the court to which the
candidate/judge aspires, may “cross the line” and reflect an
impermissible bias or unchangeable position on an issue “that
may come before the judge.”74 Moreover, some statements may
not be curable with a disclaimer, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the judge could be impartial in fact. Similarly, an
announcement of views could amount to an impermissible pledge
or promise,75 or a commitment that is inconsistent with the
impartial performance of duties on a case, controversy, or issue
likely to come before the court.76
As noted, Mr. Tembeckjian has suggested that even
assuming an announcement is not otherwise impermissible, it
may well give rise to a basis for later disqualification and to a
disciplinary violation if a judge fails to disqualify himself or
herself.77 Indeed, the ACJE specifically referenced this possibility
in Opinion 17-28.78 Suffice it to say, the analysis of any possible
conflict between permissible candidate announcements and the
rules on disqualification or recusal is esoteric: significantly,
permitting candidate announcements—only to later bar the
successful candidate from presiding in cases because of those
announcements—would arguably “gut” the essential holding of
White. Nevertheless, unable to envision or contemplate every conceivable statement made by a candidate or case that might come
before the judge, I would concede that it is at least possible that
some permissible candidate statements could require disqualification later or merit discretionary recusal.

74

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i).
76
Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii); see also Ind. Comm’n on Jud. Qualifications,
Preliminary Advisory Op. 1-02 (2002), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/files/
jud-qual-adops-1-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9TV-SBF2] (“A statement which appears
to constitute a mere expression of fact, such as a candidate’s reference to a record of
imposing harsh penalties in criminal cases, may be deemed an implied promise of
future conduct . . . .”).
77
Tembeckjian, supra note 33.
78
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-28 (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-28.htm [https://perma.cc/56ACUMLY].
75
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Questions to be Considered in Analyzing Judicial Candidate
Announcements

In this Section, I will analyze, and offer my opinion on, various hypothetical announcements, in order to highlight some of
the potential problems discussed above. To analyze specific examples of announcements, I have formulated the following
questions, all derived from specific rules that directly or indirectly affect candidate speech:
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made,
indicate an unchangeable position or refusal to follow
applicable law, on issues that may come before the judge?
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made,
indicate bias or prejudice against or in favor of particular
parties or classes of parties?
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made,
contain a pledge or promise which is either express or
implied?
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made,
contain a commitment with respect to cases or controversies
likely to come before the court?
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made,
contain an express or implied commitment with respect to
issues likely to come before the court?
• Is the statement false?

B. Some Hypothetical Announcements
Below, I have categorized hypothetical statements into three
categories: (1) Statements of Past Activities, (2) Statements of
Present Beliefs, and (3) Prospective Statements. Within each of
these categories, I analyze the propriety of statements using the
six-question analytical framework discussed above. Hopefully,
these specific illustrations can shed light on how impartiality
principles may be applied in practice, and can, in turn, illustrate
the challenges at the heart of analyzing the Right to Life Questionnaire.
1.

Statements of Past Activities
I worked for NARAL.

I participated in pro-life
activities.

I campaigned for pro-choice
candidates.

I used to picket at abortion
clinics and went to the Right to
Life march every January.
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All four of these are permissible statements by a candidate
under White and under the applicable judicial ethics rules in
New York. They involve past activities and result in negative
answers to each question. It is true that the issue of abortion is
unlikely to come before the court, making most of the answers to
the above questions negative. However, even if the issue of abortion may come before the court, the statements would still be
permissible.
Of course, the context in which the statements are made
could be significant. For example, if statements are made in response to questions which ask, “What would you do in the
future?” or “How would you decide?” or “What can we expect from
you?”, responses such as “I can’t answer your question, however,
I participated in pro-life activities” or “I can’t answer your question but I campaigned only for pro-choice candidates,” could be
problematic as they imply a promise or commitment. In that instance, a properly worded disclaimer to the effect that “I must
follow binding precedent in all cases,” might be sufficient to cure
the problem. As stand-alone statements, however, they are
permissible.
2.

Statements of Present Beliefs
1. I am pro-abortion/pro-choice. I am pro-life.
2. I am pro-abortion/pro-choice.
However, I acknowledge that
I am always required to
follow the principle of stare
decisis and binding
precedent.

I am pro-life. However, I
acknowledge that I am
always required to follow the
principle of stare decisis and
binding precedent.

3. I believe that the
constitution protects choice.

I believe that the constitution
contains no right to abortion.

4. I believe that the constitution protects choice.
However, I acknowledge that
I am always required to
follow the principle of stare
decisis and binding
precedent.

I believe that the constitution
contains no right to abortion.
However, I acknowledge that
I am always required to
follow the principle of stare
decisis and binding
precedent.

5. I believe that personhood
begins at the point of
independent viability of the
fetus.

I believe that personhood
begins at conception.
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6. I believe that personhood
begins at the point of
independent viability of the
fetus. However, I acknowledge that I am always
required to follow the
principle of stare decisis and
binding precedent and decide
every case on the facts
without regard to my
personal opinion.
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I believe that personhood
begins at conception.
However, I acknowledge that
I am always required to
follow the principle of stare
decisis and binding precedent
and decide every case on the
facts without regard to my
personal opinion.

These are all permissible statements by a candidate under
White and under the applicable judicial ethics rules in New York.
Although the first set of statements contains no disclaimer,
and the second set does, both are permissible. A disclaimer is not
necessary, as the answer to all questions would still be negative.
Even assuming that the issue of abortion might come before the
court, the statements do not necessarily reflect bias or a lack of
impartiality, as defined above. Again, a judge can ethically have
opinions and preconceptions on law.
The third set of statements is also permissible, without a
disclaimer. This issue is unlikely to come before the court, particularly in New York state courts, and the statements contain no
pledges or promises, nor do they show bias. Also, even if there
was a problem with the third set, the disclaimer in the fourth set
would cure that issue.
The fifth set of statements, in theory, could be implicated in
cases unrelated to abortion, such as those involving pre-natal or
defendants’ rights in the civil and criminal context, and,
therefore, are more likely to come before some courts than the
issue of abortion. Nevertheless, they do not commit the judge to
a position, imply a promise or pledge, or indicate an unchangeable position or refusal to follow the law. Although an argument
could be made that they present a bias against “particular
parties or classes of parties,”79 it is a very weak argument. In
fact, in the Tembeckjian article, he approved of a similarly
worded statement.80 Moreover, to the extent that there might be

79

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 767 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
80
Tembeckjian, supra note 33.

2020]

PERMISSIBLE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH

99

a problem with the statements, the disclaimer in the sixth set of
statements should be sufficient to cure them.81
3.

Additional Statements of Present Beliefs
I believe that decisions which I believe that Roe v. Wade was
placed restrictions on the right wrongly decided.
to choose were wrongly
decided.
I believe that decisions which
placed restrictions on the right
to choose were wrongly decided. However, I acknowledge
that if elected, I am required
to follow binding precedent.

I believe that Roe v. Wade was
wrongly decided. However, I
acknowledge that if elected, I
am required to follow binding
precedent.

Both of the above sets of statements should be considered
permissible under White and under the applicable judicial ethics
rules in New York. The disclaimer in the second set of statements may be prudent but should not be necessary as the first
statement does not indicate bias or unwillingness to follow the
law, nor does it contain a pledge or promise. Moreover, the issue
of abortion is not likely to come before the courts in New York.
4.

Prospective Statements
I would uphold a woman’s
right to choose in all cases.

I would strike down the socalled right to choose and
overturn Roe v. Wade, which
was wrongly decided.

I believe that no restrictions
can lawfully be placed on
abortion.

The first set of statements contains pledges/promises; the
second statement arguably contains an implied promise. I would
suggest that these are impermissible.

81

See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 67, at 239 (“[T]he disqualification of a
judge in such a case could have practical consequences that could not have been
intended . . . [given that] any judge who has expressed a position on an issue or a
commitment to a cause could be said to have implied a bias for or against particular
parties in such cases.”).
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I believe that doctors who
perform abortions are heroes
to be honored and celebrated.
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I believe that doctors who
perform abortions are
murderers.

This set of statements may be problematic because they
appear to demonstrate bias in favor of or against particular
parties or classes of parties. It is unlikely that a disclaimer—
even if true—would cure the problem as in the following two
examples:
I believe that doctors are untrustworthy. However, I would
treat all litigants who appear before me equally, fairly, and
without pre-disposition.
I believe that Italian-Americans are generally “mobbed up.”
However, I would treat them equally, fairly, and impartially if
they had matters before me. My judicial duties come before my
personal beliefs.82

VIII. THE RIGHT TO LIFE QUESTIONNAIRE83
In considering the specific questionnaire that is the subject
of the ACJE Opinion 17-28, it must be remembered that the
candidate can speak on controversial issues and that there is no
restriction against commenting on pending or impending cases.
My analysis concerning whether the candidate can answer the
questions is contained in the paragraphs after the answer choices.
1. VALUE OF EARLY HUMAN LIFE. Recognizing the judicial
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher courts and
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor
stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and
facts of that case, in accord with the position of the New York
State Right to Life Committee, I believe that the unborn child is
biologically human and alive and that the right to life of human
82

Permissible or not? Candidate for election to the Supreme Court:

I believe that verdicts in personal
injury actions have tended to be
high, however I recognize that in
reviewing personal injury awards,
binding precedent must be followed.

I believe that verdicts in personal
injury actions are obscenely high,
however I recognize that in reviewing
personal injury awards, binding
precedent in this department must
be followed.
I would argue that the first statement is permissible. The second is problematic and
indicates bias. It is not clear that the disclaimer is sufficient because of the
descriptive word “obscenely.” In other words, even assuming that the judge could be
impartial, the appearance of impartiality has been lost.
83
Questionnaire, supra note 3.
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beings should be respected at every stage of their biological
development.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline84

It is my opinion that a candidate can answer this question.
It does not concern an issue likely to come before the courts,
makes no commitments, does not indicate an unchangeable position or refusal to follow the law on issues that may come before
the judge, and does not reflect bias. The use of the disclaimer is
likely unnecessary but is sufficient to cure any problems.
2. LEGAL ABORTION. The New York State Right to Life Committee believes that unborn children should be protected by law
and that abortion should be permitted only when necessary to
prevent the death of the mother. Recognizing the judicial
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher courts and
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor
stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and
facts of that case, state your personal view on when, if ever,
abortion should be legal.
a. I believe that abortion should be permitted only to
prevent the death of the mother.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline
I believe that abortion should be permitted only to
prevent the mother’s death, in cases of incest, and in
reported cases of forcible rape.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline85

b.

It is my opinion that a candidate can answer this question.
It does not commit the candidate with respect to cases or
controversies likely to come before the court, nor does it show
bias or prejudice, etc.
3. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION. In
its 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court found a
“right to abortion” under the U.S. Constitution that invalidated
the abortion statutes of all 50 states. Recognizing the judicial
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher-courts, and
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor

84
Id. at *1 (footnote omitted). A candidate who declines to answer is indicating
that he or she believes in good faith that, under a reasonable construction of applicable Canons of Judicial Conduct or because recusal would subsequently be necessary,
declination is required. Id. I note that the questionnaire’s reference to required
“recusal” is likely incorrect; it should read “disqualification.”
85
Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted).
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stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and
facts of that case, I believe that Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline86

The candidate can answer this question.
4. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION. Aside
from the federal constitutional “right to abortion” recognized in
Roe v. Wade, several state courts have held that there is a state
right to abortion under their state constitutions. Thus far, the
courts of New York have not recognized a “right to abortion”
under our state Constitution. Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of higher courts and applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis,
and to decide any future case based on the law and facts of that
case, I believe that there is no provision in our current New York
State Constitution which is intended to protect a right to
abortion.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline87

In my opinion, the candidate can answer the question. It
contains no statement of bias or other lack of impartiality (as
defined) and makes no commitment, pledge, or promise. I note
that it can be deemed a neutral, factual statement, particularly
in view of Governor Cuomo’s call for an amendment to the state
constitution to protect abortion rights.88
I would add that if a statement is objectively false, then the
candidate obviously should not make it.
5. STATE RIGHT TO ABORTION FUNDING. In several decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld under the U.S. Constitution the decisions of federal, state, and local governments
to prohibit the use of public funds or facilities for abortion when
the mother’s life was not at stake. However, several state courts
have held under state constitutions that public funds and
facilities must be made available to fund and facilitate abortion
when a physician deems abortion “necessary” for any reason.
State Supreme Courts in New Jersey and Alaska have held that
under state law abortion must be provided in even private non86

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
87
Id. (footnote omitted).
88
Press Release, New York State Governor, Governor Cuomo Proposes
Constitutional Amendment Codifying Roe v. Wade into the New York State Constitution
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-proposes-constitutionalamendment-codifying-roe-v-wade-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/Q7ME-TFYS].
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religious facilities that serve the public at large or when
abortion would otherwise be unavailable in a locale. Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case
based on the law and facts of that case, I believe that there is no
provision of our current New York State Constitution which is
intended to require the use of public funds for abortion or to
require that public or private health care facilities must provide
or permit abortions on their premises.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline89

It is my opinion that the candidate can answer this question.
Again, it contains no pledge, promise, or commitment and does
not show bias against any party, etc. As above, if a statement is
objectively false, it should not be made.
6. STATE RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no right
to assisted suicide under the U.S. Constitution. In a companion
case, Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court also held that equal
protection of law under U.S. Constitution was not violated by a
ban on physician[-]assisted suicide for the terminally ill,
although the law permits life-sustaining treatment to be
withheld or withdrawn from the terminally ill. The state
Supreme Courts of Florida and Alaska have held that their
state constitutions do not protect a right to assisted suicide.
Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents
of higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case
based on the law and facts of that case, I believe that there is no
provision of our current New York State Constitution which is
intended to protect a right to assisted suicide.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline90

The candidate can answer this question affirmatively. I note
that the question was undoubtedly drafted prior to the Court of
Appeals’ decision in Myers v. Schneiderman, wherein the court
held that there was no constitutional right to “aid-in-dying.”91
Thus, an affirmative answer is consistent with the law. A negative

89

Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *3 (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)).
91
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answer to this question is problematic because of the absence of
any reference to Myers.
Hypothetically, depending upon the wording of the question,
a candidate should be able to express disagreement with existing
law (as discussed infra) provided there is no indication of a
willingness to not follow the law. For example, I have had occasion to express to my New York Civil Practice students my
intense dislike of Curry v. MacKenzie, in which Judge Cardozo
first articulated the unpleaded defense rule, and the impact of
that case on the quality of pleadings in New York.92 Yet, I am,
always and ever, bound to follow its mandate.
As above, of course, if a statement is objectively false, it
should not be made.
7. DISPOSITION OF HUMAN BEINGS IN VITRO. Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case based
on the law and facts of that case, I believe in accord with the
position of the New York State Right to Life Committee, that
human beings whose lives begin by in vitro fertilization or
cloning and who exist outside the body of a woman are not
personal property and should be treated in accord with their best
interests in any dispute over their disposition.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline93

In my opinion, the candidate can answer this question.
Assuming that the law treats fetuses as property, then a negative
answer is consistent with the law and is permissible. An affirmative response, at first glance, appears to present a closer
question, but again I believe it is permissible. I note that in this
question, as in the eighth and ninth questions, use of the word
“should” does not indicate that the candidate, as judge, will rule
in contravention of law. In this regard, an affirmative response
can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the judicial obligation to
follow the law, which says that fetuses are to be treated as
personal property in any dispute over their disposition, I believe
that fetuses should not be treated as personal property in any
dispute over their disposition.” This statement does not contain
a pledge or promise, nor does it suggest that the candidate will
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239 N.Y. 267, 269–70 (N.Y. 1925).
Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *3 (footnote omitted).
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not follow the law. It is statement of disagreement with the law,
which is permissible.
8. WRONGFUL LIFE. Suits have been brought in several states
by infants born with disabilities through their parents, claiming
that those responsible for maternal health care during
pregnancy are financially liable for their “wrongful lives”
because their mothers were not afforded the opportunity to
abort them by being told that they would be born with a
disability. Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding
precedents of higher courts and applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any
future case based on the law and facts of that case, I do not
believe that a person should be able to sue another because he or
she was born alive with a disability rather than aborted.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline94

The candidate can answer this question. If the answer is affirmative, the candidate is agreeing with established New York
law that does not recognize wrongful life causes of action.95 If the
candidate answers negatively, that is nothing more than
expressing disagreement with the law as it exists. In this regard,
a negative response can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the
judicial obligation to follow the law, which does not recognize
lawsuits based on wrongful life, I believe that the law should
recognize lawsuits based on wrongful life.” This statement contains no pledge or promise or commitment, etc., and the
disclaimer is sufficient to ameliorate any potential problem with
its utterance.
9. WRONGFUL BIRTH. Suits have been brought in several
states by parents of children born with disabilities against
maternal health care providers for the care and upkeep of their
disabled children because the mothers were not provided the
opportunity to have their unborn children tested for disabilities
so that a “wrongful birth” could have been avoided by aborting
any disabled child. Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow
binding precedents of higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to
decide any future case based on the law and facts of that case, I
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1984).

Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979 (N.Y.
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do not believe that parents should be able to sue another because
their child was born alive with a disability rather than aborted.
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline96

The candidate can answer the question. As wrongful birth is
a cognizable claim in New York,97 a negative answer is a statement consistent with the law as it exists. An affirmative answer
is a disagreement with the law, which contains no pledge or
promise or commitment, etc. In this regard, an affirmative response can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the judicial
obligation to follow the law, which permits wrongful birth
lawsuits, I believe that the law should not permit wrongful birth
lawsuits. It is a permissible statement.”
CONCLUSION
In view of New York’s elimination of the announce clause
and the Supreme Court’s opinion in White, and upon a review of
the applicable judicial canons and rules as well as the commission determinations, committee opinions, and scholarly
commentary, it is my opinion that judicial candidates should be
allowed to answer the Right to Life Questionnaire. I strongly
disagree with Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 1728, in which the Committee opined that judges could not ethically
answer the questionnaire. I believe that the opinion serves to
undermine the holding of White, which greatly expanded the
speech rights of judicial candidates. That said, and despite my
strong disagreement with the Opinion, I will follow its
proscription as I feel ethically obliged to do.
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Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *4 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 412–13 (N.Y. 1978).

